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Background: The concept of function is central to both biology and technology, but neither in philosophy nor in
formal ontology is there a generally accepted theory of functions. In particular, there is no consensus how to
include functions into a top-level ontology or whether to include them at all.
Methods: We first review current conceptions of functions in philosophy and formal ontology and evaluate them
against a set of criteria. These evaluation criteria are derived from a synopsis of theoretical and practical
requirements that have been suggested for formal accounts of functions. In a second step, we elucidate in
particular the relation between functions and dispositions.
Results: We argue that functions should not be taken as a subtype of dispositions. The strongest reason for this is
that any view that identifies functions with certain dispositions cannot account for malfunctioning, which is having
a function but lacking the matching disposition. As a result, we suggest a cross-classification of realizables with
dispositions supervening on the physical structure of their bearer, whereas both functions and roles also have some
external grounding. While bearers can survive the gain, loss and change of roles, functions are rigid properties that
are essentially connected to their particular bearers. Therefore, Function should not be regarded as a subtype of
Disposition; rather, the classes of functions and dispositions are disjoint siblings of Realizable.
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The ascription of functions is central to biology as well
as to psychology, technology and engineering. However,
realizable entities like functions, dispositions and roles
are notoriously difficult to understand and there is no
consensus how to model them within a top-level ontol-
ogy. The more general debates in the philosophy of
biology and technology also offer several theories of
function with their respective advantages and shortcom-
ings. Because of the diversity, plurality and ambiguity of
function concepts in, e.g., engineering, some authors
have claimed that there are many different function con-
cepts which are only connected by “family resemblances”
[1]. Even if this is true, it will nevertheless be useful for the
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article, unless otherwise stated.focus on some of the more important uses of the word and
fix these within a formal ontological framework. One par-
ticular challenge is whether there can be an overarching
meaning of the term ‘function’ both for biological and arte-
factual functions.
Another challenge we will address concerns the rela-
tionships between functions and other kinds of entities
like dispositions and roles in formal ontology. That these
relations are not at all clear is witnessed by BFO, the
Basic Formal Ontology [2,3]: BFO versions up to 1.1.1
contain the categories Disposition, Function and Role as
jointly exhaustive and pairwise disjoint children of the
category Realizable, but in the transition to the new
version BFO 2 it is planned to position Function as a
subtype of Disposition (cf. Table 1 for more details).
In this paper, we will try to meet these challenges. For
this purpose, we will review different philosophical the-
ories of functions and evaluate them with respect to a
set of desiderata for function theories. In the remaindertral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
Table 1 Definitions of the children of realizables in BFO
1.1.1 and 2 (‘Graz release’)
Definition in BFO 1.1.1 [2] Definition in BFO 2 [9]
Disposition = A realizable entity
that essentially causes a specific
process or transformation in the
object in which it inheres, under
specific circumstances and in
conjunction with the laws of
nature. A general formula for
dispositions is: X (object) has the
disposition D to (transform, initiate
a process) R under conditions C.
b is a disposition means: b is a
realizable entity & b’s bearer is
some material entity & b is such
that if it ceases to exist, then its
bearer is physically changed, &
b’s realization occurs when and
because this bearer is in some
special physical circumstances,
& this realization occurs in virtue
of the bearer’s physical make-up.
Function = A realizable entity the
manifestation of which is an
essentially end-directed activity of a
continuant entity in virtue of that
continuant entity being a specific
kind of entity in the kind or kinds
of contexts that it is made for.
A function is a disposition that
exists in virtue of the bearer’s
physical make-up and this physical
make-up is something the bearer
possesses because it came into
being, either through evolution
(in the case of natural biological
entities) or through intentional
design (in the case of artefacts),
in order to realize processes of a
certain sort.
Role = A realizable entity the
manifestation of which brings
about some result or end that is
not essential to a continuant in
virtue of the kind of thing that it
is but that can be served or
participated in by that kind of
continuant in some kinds of
natural, social or institutional
contexts.
b is a role means: b is a realizable
entity & b exists because there
is some single bearer that is in
some special physical, social, or
institutional set of circumstances
in which this bearer does not
have to be & b is not such that,
if it ceases to exist, then the
physical make-up of the bearer
is thereby changed.
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tion on the current state-of-the-art representation of
functions, reviewing work on this topic published by the
research groups that developed the top-level ontologies
BFO, DOLCE and GFO [2,4,5].
Functions as realizables in BFO
In the older versions of BFO, Function, Disposition and Role
are sibling subclasses of the class Realizable dependent
continuant [6]. This common superclass implies that in-
stances of any of these three classes share the following
characteristics:
– They are continuants, i.e. they are wholly present at
every time of their existence.
– Like qualities, they are (specifically) ontologically
dependent on an independent continuant (some
material thing or system) that is their bearer.
– They are realizable, i.e. they are by definition
connected to certain types of processes such that
instances of such a process type can be realizations
of the realizable entity in question.
– When they are realized, their bearers are participants
of their realization processes, i.e. of the processes they
are roles, dispositions or functions for.Note that realizables do not need to be (always or
ever) realized [7], as, e.g. in the case of a safety mechan-
ism, the function of which will only be realized if certain
conditions obtain (and they may never obtain). Also note
that several other types of realizables are conceivable
like, e.g., propensities, tendencies, abilities, capacities,
virtues and vices [8]. Arp and Smith [6] conceptualise
the specific differences between functions, roles and dis-
positions as follows (cf. Table 1): The realizations of
functions and dispositions take place “in virtue of the
bearer’s physical makeup”, whereas a role is “optional”:
It does not reflect the intrinsic structure of their bearer
but a “natural, social or institutional set of circum-
stances”. Functions are distinguished from dispositions
by the additional condition that the function bearer pos-
sesses the physical structure that grounds the function
because of how it came to be there in the first place: In
the case of artefactual functions by intentional design
and production or in the case of biological functions by
a history of evolutionary selection. In BFO 2 the relation
of functions and dispositions was revised: functions are
now a subclass of dispositions [9], as detailed in Table 1.
Although we sympathize with BFO as a top-level ontol-
ogy and will later on use its other categories, especially
the fundamental disjoint classes of continuants and
occurrents and their relations, we find that its treatment
of functions is in need of some improvement and clarifi-
cation and we will later suggest a way to do so.
Functions and flows in DOLCE
While the top-level ontology DOLCE [4] neither in-
cludes functions nor dispositions or roles in its core ver-
sion, there are several suggestions for a formalisation of
engineering functions within the DOLCE framework
[10-12]. However, their formalisation starts from a very
specific technical approach that focuses on “flows” of
materials, energy or signals. Functions are then, basic-
ally, what relates certain input and output flows. While
being useful in engineering, this approach is mostly or-
thogonal to the debates on the functions of biological
entities. One main goal of these authors seems to be the
integration of the “flows” in the DOLCE ontology and
they accordingly classify different sorts of flow as various
types of process-like entities in DOLCE (states, pro-
cesses etc.) and characterise their dependencies and
relationships with the continuants involved (which are
called “endurants” in DOLCE). The relationships be-
tween functions, dispositions and roles that concern us
in the present paper are not discussed. We will not dis-
tinguish between different types of processes as inputs
or outputs for functions for two reasons: First, DOLCE’s
subtypes of processes are heavily description-relative and,
hence, linguistic artefacts. Second, this model is not quite
as natural for biology as for applications in engineering. We
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able to specify input and output flows. The point is not that
one could not conceptualise “seeing” in terms of “flows” of
visual and neurological signals, but that it is not necessary
to understand the function of biological organs in these
terms. Consequently, analyses of functions in the philoso-
phy of biology do not normally refer to input and output
flows (though it can be argued that such ideas are highly
relevant to certain strands of psychology or functional the-
ories of the mind). Let us go through an example: The
function of an animal’s legs is locomotion, so the actual
locomotive process of the animal is the realization of the
function and this motion could also be called an “output”.
But what is the input? Is it some neurological signal from
inside the animal or some stimulus from the environment?
Or is it a flow or change of energy in some cell or neural
pathway? In order to understand that the function of legs is
locomotion, the question about the input seems to be ir-
relevant. In any case, such a fine-grained approach with re-
spect to input or output flows does not add anything to the
main question of our paper. We take up this point again in
the Methods section.
Work from the GFO-Group
An elaborate and somewhat complicated model of func-
tions has been developed by researchers from the
OntoMed group that has produced the General Formal
Ontology (GFO) [13,14]. According to GFO, like in
BFO, functions have realizations which are usually pro-
cesses, but unlike in BFO, these realizations could also
be continuant entities. Burek et al. characterise a func-
tion by three “function determinants”, in particular:
(1) the preconditions for the realization of this
function,
(2) the goal affected or brought about by the function
(or its realization, respectively),
(3) the “functional item” which corresponds to the role
of the material bearer of the function as the
participant in the realization of the function.
In addition to functions and realizations, they intro-
duce “realizers”. A realizer is the actual particular entity
that plays the role of the “functional item”. Furthermore,
they distinguish the realization of a function (usually a
process) from the “goal” which is a “state of the world”
that is reached by means of the realization starting from
the precondition requirements. The authors illustrate
these components using the example of oxygen trans-
port in the human body. The realization of this function
is an actual process of oxygen transportation and it has
as precondition the presence of some oxygen at location
A and as goal state the presence of some oxygen at
location B. The “functional item” is denoted by thenominalised role term “oxygen transporter” and in the
case of oxygen transports in the human body this role
is played by instances of red blood cells, which are,
thereby, “realizers” of this function. Thus, according to
this approach, roles are, to some extent, always in-
volved when we deal with functions and roles are expli-
citly dependent on “role contexts”. However, note that
these “roles” are different from BFO roles and should
not be confused with them.
Burek et al. also distinguish “dispositional function”
from “actual function” where the latter applies only to
functions that are actually realized. This seems to be re-
dundant as it ignores that this modal feature is captured
already by the distinction between functions as realiz-
ables and their realization processes. Despite its elabor-
ate apparatus, this approach does not help much to
distinguish functions from roles and dispositions be-
cause all three terms are used to characterise functions.
Elsewhere Burek seems to conceive of functions as a
subclass of dispositions, stating that only the dispositions
for “effects of an item which are related to some (pre-)
defined system of functions and goals” are its functions
[14]. This statement could be taken to mean that func-
tions should be understood as a special kind of dispos-
ition. In any case, it seems that intentions of agents (like
designers and users of an artefact) choose the functions
of an item and functions are characterised as intentional
entities ([14] definition 67, p.157) and, therefore, agent-
dependent (or community-dependent) and subjective.
Altogether, this account seems to be better suited to
technical functions. Still, many of its features are per-
fectly compatible with the BFO account, which we try to
improve upon. The central structure of functions as
having bearers and being realized in processes with the
bearers as participants is very similar. BFO refrains from
some subtleties like the explicit consideration of the
preconditions for the realization of a function or the dis-
tinction between a goal-state and the realization as a
process leading to a goal state. A possible reason for
abstracting from these distinctions is the actual talk
about functions in much of biology (and the philosophy
of biology) where the process of blood-pumping as a
realization of the heart’s function is normally not con-
trasted with a distinct goal state like, e.g., the distribu-
tion of nutrients and oxygen in the body achieved by the
blood-pumping. For many organic functions, the pre-
conditions for realization are often implicitly presup-
posed. For example, the function of the heart is to pump
blood and in order to realize this function it has to be
part of a living body, be connected to arteries and veins,
and enough blood to be pumped has to be present. All
of these are, of course, features of a physiological organ-
ism. Biologists do describe these from the point of view
of the whole organism and not for each organ separately.
Röhl and Jansen Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2014, 5:27 Page 4 of 16
http://www.jbiomedsem.com/content/5/1/27To spell these conditions out would be a tedious and
possibly endless endeavour: In order to play a part in
locomotion from A to B, legs must be part of an organ-
ism situated at A, but not at B, there must not be a hin-
drance between A and B, it must be possible to be
located at B, etc. All this is true, but of no specific inter-
est to the biologist. To conclude, the approach by Burek
et al. seems to be compatible with the BFO approach in
its main features, but does not help much with the prob-
lems of distinguishing and relating functions, roles and
dispositions.
Methods
We will proceed in two steps in this paper. First, we survey
philosophical theories of functions and evaluate them
against a set of requirements. The theories evaluated are
mostly theories of biological functions, but we also look at
some theories for artefact functions. In the discussion sec-
tion we take up the results of this survey and take a closer
look at the relation between functions and dispositions.
The requirements used as evaluation criteria will be
detailed in this section. In the literature, several lists of
requirements or criteria for a theory of functions have
been suggested. As will become clear, we will not use all
these criteria, but need to pick out a coherent subset of
criteria that we will use in this paper.
We extract from Artiga [15] for biological and from
Houkes and Vermaas [16] for artefactual functions the
following list of adequacy criteria for function theories
(somewhat adapting them to our own terminology):
(1) Teleology: The function should have a central role
in the explanation of the existence of the function
bearer [15].
(2) Restriction: Proper or essential functions of a thing
can be distinguished from its accidental functions
or transient effects [15,16].
(3) a. Normativity: The performance of a function can
be evaluated as better or worse according to a
norm given (at least implicitly) by the function
ascription [15].
b. Malfunctioning: A thing can have a function,
although it fails to perform according to this
function occasionally or even permanently. Failure to
properly perform according to one’s function can be a
case of malfunctioning or of non-functioning [16].
(4) a. Avoidance of epiphenomenalism: Functions
should be determined by current performance of its
bearer, not mainly by causally inert historical facts
like its (evolutionary or cultural) history or a mere
ascription by its producers, users, or observers [15].
b. Support: The physical structure of the function
bearer supports its function, even in the cases of
accidental functions or dysfunction [16].(5) Innovation: Novel functions can be ascribed
correctly to innovative artefacts [16], but also to
newly evolved organisms.
There are some tensions between these desiderata [17]
which are also acknowledged by the authors who pro-
posed them. Artiga argues that the normativity criterion
and avoidance of epiphenomenalism cannot be satisfied
at the same time because (3) implies that function as-
criptions should somehow be independent from the
actual properties or activities of the function bearer
while (4a) explicitly denies this [15]. Likewise, Houkes
and Vermaas state a tension between the malfunction
criterion (3b) and the support criterion (4b) for their
theory of artefact functions [16]. They claim to have
solved this for artefactual functions. This solution is
based on, firstly, an optimistic view of the rationality of
designers, users and other ascribers of functions who
would not, or so they assume, assign unsupported func-
tions and, secondly, on a history of maintenance and re-
pair that makes a distinction between non-function and
malfunction easier. But it might well be that not all of
the criteria can be satisfied simultaneously and that
some may have to be relaxed in any theory of functions.
Normativity is one of the most crucial, but also most
contested desiderata for functions. To assert that some-
thing has a function or that a function can be performed
better or worse, we need some kind of normative dimen-
sion. Franssen points out that, as a biological concept, it
would have to be naturalist and, thus, cannot be norma-
tive in the full-blown moral sense [18], but for the nor-
mative dimension of functions it should suffice that it
accounts for the fulfilling (or missing) of purpose in a
naturalist way [19]. Franssen suggests that we could
understand the normativity of functions in a deflationary
way; that is, in terms of the rational expectations we
have with respect to the functions of organs or artefacts.
However, this kind of normativity ascription is too weak
because it lays no special claim to functions in particu-
lar. We form these rational expectations also with re-
spect to a dropped stone that “is supposed to” fall
(thereby obeying a law of nature). Furthermore, Franssen
argues that, in biology, functions are attributed more
widely than the associated normative evaluations [18].
Many traits or behaviours of living beings can be de-
scribed as having functions in the evolutionary sense, but
are usually not evaluated in the way organs (as quasi-tools
of an organism) are. However, we can ignore these border-
line cases and still acknowledge that we need the norma-
tivity in the case of organs or more generally for all
subsystems of organisms to which functions are ascribed
and which are evaluated with respect to their perform-
ance, as it is clearly the case in medical contexts. These
use-cases show that we do need to deal with the
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ion at some expense of criterion (4).
We supplement these criteria with some requirements
for an ontology of functions proposed by Burek [14]:
(6) Continuants: Functions should not be conflated
with their realizations. While functions (and
other realizables like dispositions and roles) are
continuants, i.e. existing wholly at any point
of time during their existence, their realizations
are processes that stretch out in time.
(7) Bridging of Domains: An ontology of functions
should account for both artefacts (devices) and
non-artefacts.
We regard it as an asset of a theory of function if it
can account for biological and engineered function as
uniformly as is permissible given the differences between
the two domains. While (6) is fulfilled by all approaches
in our survey, it is acted against by such a prominent
system as the Gene Ontology [20], which does not
clearly separate functions and activities because the term
Molecular function is used both in the sense of an activ-
ity and in the sense of a capability: “Molecular function
is defined as the biochemical activity (including specific
binding to ligands or structures) of a gene product. This
definition also applies to the capability that a gene prod-
uct (or gene product complex) carries as a potential”.
[21] That functions themselves can sometimes be
processes has also been suggested by Kitamura and
Mizoguchi [22], who talk about processes as “actual
functions”. However, what they call an “actual function”
corresponds rather to functioning than to function, i.e.
to what we (with BFO) call a realization of a function.
Only their “capacity function” corresponds to what we
call “function” proper. Thus, while they use the term
“function” for processes, they do not claim processes
are functions in the same sense as the functions as-
cribed to devices.
Hence, we strongly support (6) and (7), but we will
not consider the following desiderata (8) and (9), which
have also been suggested by Burek [14]:
(8) Process functions: Processes can be bearers of
functions.
(9) Decomposition: An ontology of functions should
support functional decomposition, i.e. the analysis
in terms of sub-functions.
Criterion (8) is contentious, as it is in direct contradiction
to our preferred framework BFO where only independent
continuants can be bearers of functions. We do acknow-
ledge that natural language does, in fact, attribute functions
to processes like in the following examples:A. “His knocking at the door had the function to cause
someone to open the door.”
B. “The pumping has the function to keep the blood
circulating.”
However, surface grammar might be deceiving. Ex-
ample (A) is a description of an intentional action and
the agent knocking at the door performs this action be-
cause of a certain purpose. This shows that it is not ne-
cessary to ascribe functions to processes because this
comes down to the ascription of intentions or plans of
persons participating in these processes. In example (B),
the function to keep the blood circulating can, as well,
be ascribed to the heart, which is an independent con-
tinuant, as BFO requires. The heart can also be said to
have the function to pump blood and given the heart’s
canonical location within a circulatory system, it fulfils
the former function by realizing the latter: It keeps the
blood circulating by pumping it. Hence, in these cases,
we have an instrumental or causal relation between two
processes. While this is an important feature to be mod-
elled, we hesitate to deal with it together with the func-
tions of independent continuants.
We do not consider (9), as decomposition is orthog-
onal to the relationship between functions and disposi-
tions and, thus, not relevant to the topic of this paper.
Decomposition seems to be of interest mainly in the
technical domain and is hardly discussed for bio-
functions in applied ontology, but it can, of course, be
extended to this domain. This is nicely shown by the
heart example that we just discussed: The heart sup-
plies oxygene to the body by circulating the blood, and
it keeps the blood circulating by pumping it (cf. the
hierarchies of biological functions in [23]). Of course,
composition of functions cannot be analogous to the
mereological composition of the whole by its parts be-
cause the function of the whole is not simply the sum
of the functions of its parts. Nevertheless, a function of
a whole often depends on the functions of its parts, but
the composition relation for functions is not straight-
forward and would be a different topic. While func-
tional decomposition is compatible with our approach,
it is not relevant for our present purposes. For these
reasons, we will use the criteria (1)–(7) only.
Results
Survey of philosophical theories of functions
The concept of a function has provoked a lively debate
in the philosophy of biology, of mind and of engineering.
Several accounts have been proposed to illuminate the
nature of biological functions; see [24] and [25] for re-
cent contributions to this debate. We will now survey
the most important suggestions and evaluate them with
respect to the desiderata given above.
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functions, three main classes of theories may be distinguished.
Like Franssen [18] and Artiga [15], we start by looking at (a)
causal contribution theories of functions and (b) etiological ac-
counts. We add to this by looking at (c) intentional accounts
and two further developments of the intentional account,
namely (d) the ICE theory that combines intentional, causal
and etiological elements, and the (e) fictionalist account that
extends the intentional account to biological functions.
Causal contribution theories of functions
Causal contribution theories take criterion (4) as suffi-
cient for the ascription of a function. They are also called
“dispositional” [15], “causal role” [26], “goal-contribution”
[27], and “systemic” [28] accounts of functions. They all
have in common that the function of a thing is linked to
the present causal contribution of the function bearer in a
certain context. The most straightforward is the simple
causal role analysis. According to this analysis, “X has func-
tion F” simply means that X does causally contribute to
some output O of a complex system S [26,27]. A well-
known problem of this account is that it is extremely broad
and admits many unintuitive functions: It implies, e.g. that
clouds could be ascribed the function to produce rain be-
cause they undoubtedly have a central causal role in the
production of rain (more examples and further criticism in
[27]). Thus, the simple causal role account fails the teleology
criterion and no distinction between essential and accidental
functions is possible. To ameliorate this, further conditions
have to be added in order to narrow down possible functions
of a thing. As functions are intuitively connected either with
some intention, as in artefactual functions, or a (not neces-
sarily intended or conscious) goal in biological functions,
Boorse’s “general goal-contribution” approach [27] could be
considered the “minimal core” of the concept of a function
with system S, system part X and goal G:
X performs function Z in the G-ing of S at t if and only
if at t, the Z-ing of X is a causal contribution to G.
But this still does not satisfy all of the criteria. First,
Boorse’s definition does not capture functions as such,
but only their realizations. Moreover, Boorse-functions
could be performed only once or accidentally and fulfil
this definition which would usually not be what we
mean when we ascribe a function. (A formal-ontological
characterization of such a goal-contribution approach
has been sketched in [29]). Boorse still has to rely on
distinctions like the “normal” function of a type as opposed
to accidental functions or deviations of single tokens to
avoid those counterintuitive accidental functions. We will
come back to the type/token relation as a source of norma-
tivity below. An even more challenging problem for this ac-
count is posed by malfunctioning because if X does notperform Z (i.e. if function Z is not actually realized) and no
actual causal contribution takes place, we cannot ascribe a
function at all. Therefore it is not clear how malfunctioning
should be handled within this framework.
The concept of a systemic function, as suggested by
Mizoguchi et al. [28], is very similar. They introduce a
“systemic context” that structures a system into a nested
hierarchy of subsystems and components and assigns a
specific behaviour to the system and its components in
order to define an object’s “systemic function”:
An object A performs a systemic function within a
systemic context C, if and only if there is a system S
such that:(1) C is a systemic context for S,
(2) according to C, A is a component of a subsystem of S,
(3) the goal of this subsystem is to realize the goal of C, and
(4) some behaviours of A play the (functional) role
determined by C.
This definition can be applied both to biological and
to technical functions. To give a biological example, a
systemic context C for the human liver (=A) would be
the human digestive system (goal: digestion of food and
extraction of nutrients) and within the subsystem of fat
digestion the function of the liver is the production of
bile. The point is that the systemic function is context-
dependent in a specific way, i.e. via a system its bearer is
part of. Hence, the function of a thing can change de-
pending on the system it is a component of. In an earlier
paper [22], Kitamura and Mizoguchi discuss the example
of a heat-exchanging device. This device shows as char-
acteristic behaviour a process of heat transfer that leads
to a temperature change in some fluid. This behaviour
can serve different functions: It can either have the
function of heating by “giving heat” or the function of
cooling by “removing heat”. Kitamura and Mizoguchi,
therefore, call the role of the behaviour which the device
plays in the respective teleological context (here: heat
exchange) the “actual function” of the device. Depending
on context, this will be heating or cooling. Their expression
“actual function” corresponds to what we call “realization
of a function” and their “capacity function” corresponds to
our “function”. If we follow the idea that the realization gets
its role depending on context, we could say that the device
has the capacity (=disposition) for the realization heat-
exchanging, but can have the (capacity) function of heating
or cooling depending on the context. Thus, the context-
dependence of the realization of a function can also be
claimed for the function as a realizable entity.
In this way, the proper function is fixed by the respect-
ive context and can be distinguished from accidental
functions. Therefore, the accidental/essential distinction
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“all systemic functions are essential with respect to the
systemic context” [28] (italics in the original). However,
it is not clear how the systemic context can be fixed
without recourse to other factors. Intentional design is
such a factor which Kitamura and Mizoguchi [22] take
as a standard example for such a context.
To summarize: The causal contribution approaches
can account well for the support criterion because func-
tions are closely tied to the dispositions of their bearers
and their realizations. They have no problem with novel
functions because nothing is said about the history of
the function bearer; they avoid epiphenomenalism be-
cause the actual performance is central. On the other
hand, the problem of accidental and essential functions
can only be dealt with by embedding the bearer in a sys-
tem, which, in turn, may lead to the problem of deter-
mining the proper context of a function and, thus, to
circularity, making the proper context depend on the
proper function and vice versa. A central problem for
this account is the possibility of malfunctioning, for if
function is taken to be identical with the actual causal
contribution of the function bearer, it is not clear how
something can both have a function and not perform ad-
equately and it seems very hard to distinguish malfunc-
tion from the absence of function. We will come back to
this later, but we already note here that many authors do
not employ the idea of realizables and, therefore, do not
distinguish as sharply between the having of a function
(or a disposition) and the actual taking place of the re-
spective realization process. In the approach that takes
functions as realizable entities, it is clear from the outset
that something may have a function without actually or
ever performing it. This does justice to the fact that a
function ascription is not tied to actual performance
and, thus, rejects the causal role criterion as sufficient
for a function ascription, but this alone is not sufficient
to explain malfunction.
Etiological theories of functions
As an alternative to causal contribution theories, etio-
logical accounts of biological functions have been sug-
gested [30,31]. While the causal theories of functions
which we discussed so far focus on the effects of func-
tions, etiological theories focus on their causes: The core
idea of etiological theories of functions is that a function
of X plays a relevant role in an explanation of why X
exists in the first place. In the present section we will
discuss only those etiological accounts that refer to non-
intentional causes, while we will discuss intentional
accounts of functions in the next section. In non-
intentional etiological accounts, a function is taken to be
dependent on the history of the biological kind whose
instances are bearers of the function in question (or, assome prefer, on the history of matching “reproductively
established families” [30]), i.e. on the series of evolu-
tionary precursors of a present function bearer. It is
evolutionary selection that causally explains the exist-
ence of the functional parts in the first place. Thus we
can phrase the etiological account of biological func-
tions as follows:
Instances of a biological kind X have the function to
do F if and only if the F-ing of the instances of X has
in the past been causally responsible for the positive
selection of X and, thus, indirectly for the present
existence of instances of X.
Such an etiological approach can deal with the most
salient difficulties of the causal contribution accounts.
Essential functions can be distinguished from accidental
ones by referring to the selection history of the trait; fur-
thermore, this history is determined by salient effects of
earlier versions of the trait, so no external goal or con-
text seems necessary. Since performance of a function is
clearly distinguished from having a function, something
can have a function (due to its history), but actually be
malfunctioning in the present [15]. However, recall
Franssen’s criticism of the normativity of evolutionary
functions mentioned in the methods section. Many traits
of an organism could be considered to be functional be-
cause of their evolutionary history, but would not qualify
as functions in the everyday sense and are usually not
evaluated with respect to norms. Franssen also sees a
proliferation problem if, e.g., foxes are ascribed the func-
tion to hunt, eat and, thus, control the population of
rabbits because they evolved in this way [18].
In any case, etiological accounts have problems with
respect to the avoidance of epiphenomenalism and with
novel functions: Functionality is exclusively determined
by evolutionary development, and such historical facts
are causally inert. Moreover, due to the necessity of hav-
ing a selection history, there cannot be any functions in
the first generation of a biological type, although the
actual structure of the organs would be “functional” in
the everyday sense, which is very counterintuitive. In
addition, a certain body part may acquire new uses and
functions during the evolutionary history of a species
while the early history and, hence, the reasons for its
existence remain the same [27]. Sea turtles, for ex-
ample, use their flippers to bury their eggs in the sand;
this seems to be one of the functions of their flippers.
During the evolutionary history of the turtles, however,
the flippers developed as a means for locomotion and
only later acquired the digging function [32]. Peter
Godfrey-Smith has argued that functional explanation
has to focus on the recent history of species rather
than on its distant evolutionary origins [33]. One of his
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ence between functional explanations and evolutionary
history, which are two distinct tasks according to
Tinbergen’s famous four questions that biology has to
answer [34]. Hence, if functions tell us anything about
the “survival value” of a certain trait, the recent history
of a species seems to be more important than its dis-
tant evolutionary past.
Furthermore, adaptionism is no longer seen as the
only possibility how biological differentiations and func-
tions can arise [35]. More generally, according to etio-
logical accounts, the actual performance of a body part
should not be relevant because the evolutionary history
is the only thing that matters. Thus, functions seem to
be mere epiphenomena of some causal history whereas,
intuitively and methodologically, the essence of a func-
tion lies in what a thing can and is supposed to do now,
which can be understood and discovered independently
of how the thing came to be there.
Intentional accounts of functions
As a third group of theories of functions we consider
intentional accounts. They are tailored to accounting for
the design functions of artefacts: A screwdriver can be
said to have the design function to drive screws because
it is produced with the plan to be used for this purpose.
A design function, then, is not a property that inheres in
the functional artefact, but it is the content of an ascrip-
tion by an agent or a group of agents involving a plan
about the future use of this artefact (or of artefacts of
this type). They are made for a certain purpose, their
function. Let us call this the planning account of design
functions. On this account, the truth-maker of a func-
tion ascription is a plan. Houkes et al. have given an
action-theoretic analysis of use and design claiming that
the designer’s intentional plans are, in a sense, prior to
both the design of an artefact and its use by a prospect-
ive user [36]. According to this approach, both use and
design functions of artefacts are dependent on the de-
signer’s (or the client’s) ends and on his plan for achiev-
ing these ends. On such an account, artefacts are to be
described “as objects playing a role in the contexts of
both use and design, contexts that are mediated by the
communication of a user plan” [36]. (The more elabor-
ate “ICE theory” of technical artefacts by Houkes and
Vermaas [16] will be discussed in the next section as a
further development).
Intentional accounts fare well with regard to the tele-
ology criterion: Artefacts are produced in order to fulfil
the function ascribed to them by their designer. They
can distinguish well between essential and accidental
features and they can account for normativity and
innovation because all of these can be based on the in-
tentions and expectations of the designer.On the downside, design functions are grounded in
designers’ function ascriptions and not in the physical
structure of artefacts. Thus, an artefact could have any
function independently of its physical structure and dis-
positions. (It will, though, not be able to realize its func-
tion unless it possesses a corresponding disposition to
do so). One option to ameliorate this is to demand ra-
tionality of the designer: A rational designer would have
justified (although, not necessarily true) beliefs about the
components and their working together when he as-
cribes a function to the system, and would not assign
functions not supported by the structure and disposi-
tions of the components. However, it is not easy to see
how this approach can be transferred to biology, for it
seems to presuppose a rational and intentional Creator
and looks almost like intelligent design theory, outrightly
rejected by many (though not all) biologists, philoso-
phers and theologians [37]. (We will later discuss a fic-
tionalist approach that tries to overcome this problem.)
The intentional account can easily be modified in
order to deal with the so-called use functions of artefacts
(which would be classified as roles within the BFO
framework). Use functions are directed at those activities
that users actually use things for. (Cf., e.g., [28] for more
on the distinction between design function and use func-
tion and [17] for problems of this distinction.) If I use
my screw driver to open my paint cans, it has the use
function to open paint cans. It has not been produced
for this purpose; hence, the use function can differ from
its design function, though it might be just the same.
Moreover, one and the same thing can have many differ-
ent use functions at different occasions. This account
can also be extended to biomedical entities: If someone
uses digitalis to kill his wife, he has a certain action plan
that involves the participation of both a probe of digitalis
and his wife with a certain intended outcome.
The ICE theory
Houkes and Vermaas have developed a function theory
for artefacts they call “ICE theory”, reflecting the fact
that they include Intentional, Causal and Evolutionary
elements in their account [16]. The main intentional
element (I) is a use plan for the artefact that reflects the
designers’ and prospective users’ intentions. The causal
aspect (C) shows in their identification of function as-
criptions with ascriptions of “physico-chemical capaci-
ties” or, in our terminology, dispositions that ensure the
support of the function ([15]; p. 100):
A designer justifiably ascribes the disposition to V as
a function to an artefact x relative to a use plan p for
x, and relative to an account A, if and only if (I) the
designer believes both that (I1) x has the capacity to
V and that (I2) p leads to its goals due to, in part, x’s
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beliefs on the basis of A.
The evolutionary aspect of the ICE theory is very weak
and only relevant for function ascriptions by “passive”,
non-designing users (as opposed to designers) and their
use of artefacts because they need to have warranted in-
formation (by testimony) about the designer’s beliefs (I1)
and (I2) and this is transmitted “historically”. The au-
thors claim that this account does well according to
their criteria, i.e. to (2) Restriction, (3b) Malfunctioning,
(4b) Support and (5) Innovation. Due to the specifica-
tions of the originally intended use plan, accidental func-
tions can be excluded and novel functions are no
problem; and on account of the identification of func-
tions with dispositions, there is no threat of epiphenom-
enalism: Since designers and users need to have the
justified belief that the thing in question actually has this
disposition in order to ascribe the corresponding func-
tion, the support criterion is satisfied and cases of
wishful thinking are excluded. Note that this is an epi-
stemic understanding of the “support” that the physical
structure lends to functions. Although for many stand-
ard cases of function ascriptions the support criterion
can be satisfied in this way, such rationality constraints
do not completely exclude mad scientists and strange
function ascriptions. They cannot guarantee that func-
tion ascriptions are always veridical, and it could hap-
pen that function ascriptions are rationally justified
with respect to the available information but false.
Malfunctioning is still considered a difficult case for the
ICE-theory by its authors. In many cases of malfunctioning,
users ascribing an ICE-function may be wrong but justified
because they are not aware that the artefact in question has
lost the respective disposition. Users can also be fully aware
of the lack of capacity because they know the artefact to be
broken, but they assume that repair is possible and planned.
Intuitively, we would ascribe the function to the broken
artefact, but, according to the ICE definition, this would
not be justified. Houkes & Vermaas distinguish having a
disposition from its performance and use this for other
cases of non-performance because necessary conditions for
the realizations are not met, as in the case of a car with an
empty fuel tank. Overall, they find it necessary to refer to a
background of maintenance and repair to distinguish mal-
functioning from non-functioning. Some damage of arte-
facts responsible for their malfunction can be repaired, so
these are cases of (temporary) malfunction. However, in
some instances, repair is not technically feasible; in such
cases an artefact would definitely have lost its function.
The fictionalist account
Another modification of the intentionalist approach is the
fictionalist approach [38-40]. In pre-Darwinian biology,organisms and their parts were described as if they, too,
were something created – either, allegorically spoken, by a
personified Nature or by God as a creator. In the latter case,
ascribing functions to biological entities could be conceived
of as reading the mind of God before the act of creation
and as a reconstruction of the reasoning underlying His
creation; we mentioned this option in the context of the
pure intentional account. This is no longer a viable account
for modern science and much of the discussion about
biological functions can be understood as finding some
substitution for this intentional model. In the former alle-
gorical case, we have something like an as-if parlance,
which can be found, e.g. in Aristotle: Although Aristotle re-
jects the idea that the universe or life had a beginning in
time, he often says that Nature has well organised her crea-
tures [41]. We suggest to read this as a fictionalist or ‘as if ’
way to talk about biological function, meaning: Were this
plant or animal brought about by Mother Nature (a very
intelligent designer), she would have done so for good
reasons. Hence, the planning account can be upheld for
biological functions with a small modification: The truth-
maker of the ascription of a biological function is no actual
plan, but a plan within the fiction of Mother Nature design-
ing her creatures. The fictionalist account simply invites
taking the intentional approach seriously as a model, i.e. a
certain kind of fiction [42,43], without an ontological com-
mitment to the existence of Mother Nature as a real person
with beliefs and desires. That is, Mother Nature is the func-
tional equivalent to extensionless mass-points in mechanics
or rational utility maximizers in economics: They do not
need to exist to make the theory in question an explanatory
or predictive success. This way, the fictionalist account
allows extending the intentional account to biological
functions, while retaining the plain intentional account
for artefacts.
The fictionalist account does well with respect to our
list of criteria. Like in the original intentional account,
functions feature in a teleological explanation (though
some transfer is needed from the fictive design model to
evolutionary reality). The fictionalist account can distin-
guish between accidental and essential functions; and it
allows for normativity and malfunctioning. Novel func-
tions can be accounted for if we situate the fictive designer
at a later stage in evolutionary history faced with different
evolutionary challenges. We can also give slightly more
optimistic answers regarding the threat of epiphenomenal-
ism and the support for the actual performance of a cer-
tain body part, as its physical structure is the most
important evidence for the function of a body part and
any informed judgement about the function of a part must
account for how its structure supports this function. Fi-
nally, there is now a viable bridge from biological func-
tions to artefactual functions, as intentional accounts fare
well with the latter anyway.
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Formal ontological and philosophical accounts of
functions
As should be clear now, the philosophical theories fare
differently with respect to the criteria set out above
(Table 2), and they do not always distinguish sharply be-
tween functions, roles and dispositions. However, BFO
draws on the different function theories for its distinc-
tions between the types of realizables. To begin with,
BFO functions and BFO dispositions are determined
by their causally relevant internal structure; this fits to
the causal-role account, as it is said that the realization
of a (biological) function “helps to realize the charac-
teristic physiology and life pattern for an organism of
the relevant type” [6]. The difference between dispositions
and functions is founded on a historical (evolutionary) or
intentional (design) component, respectively. Similarly,
these intentional and historical criteria are used in BFO 2
as the specific difference of functions as opposed to non-
functional dispositions. Thus, BFO functions are essential
features of their bearers because of either an evolution-
ary or an intentional component, whereas functions
according to a mere causal-role account would prob-
ably be classified as dispositions within BFO. What is
called optional, accidental or “use functions” in the
general debate are roles in BFO because they are not
essential to their bearers. In fact, it is essential to BFO-
roles that their bearers are not essentially playing
these roles; this is particularly clear in the case of social
roles.
Function and homology
When explicating the distinction between functions,
roles and definitions in BFO, Arp and Smith define bio-
logical functions as follows:
“A biological function is a function which inheres
in an independent continuant that is (i) part of
an organism and (ii) exists and has the physical
structure it has as a result of the coordinated
expression of that organism’s structural genes.” [6]Table 2 Evaluation of philosophical function theories
Causal role accounts Etiological a
(1) Teleology − +
(2) Accidental/essential − +
(3) Normativity/Malfunctioning − +
(4) Support/No epiphenomalism + −
(5) Novel functions + −
(6) Continuants + +
(7) Bridging of domains + +Philip Lord [44] points out that several prima facie bio-
functions are not captured by this definition because of its
restriction to organism parts on the one hand and to gene
expression as grounds for the structure on the other hand.
His counterexamples are molecular functions and functions
of whole organisms. Lord gives an alternative definition:
“A biological function is a realizable entity that
inheres in a continuant which is realized in an
activity, and where the homologous structure(s) of
individuals of closely related and the same species
bear this same biological function.” [44]
Lord claims that his definition is recursive rather than
circular, despite the occurrence of the word “function”
in the definiens. While this can be considered to be a
problem on its own, his suggestion is also open to coun-
terexamples when it comes to more recently acquired
functions like the sea turtle’s flippers, which are used to
bury their eggs in the sand (see above), but have homo-
logues in other species that have (only) the function of
locomotion. Lord realizes this when trying to distinguish
functions from roles: A human can walk on his hands,
but the function of the human hand is not walking as
most humans do not walk on their hands, whereas the
hand’s homologous structures in other primates do have
this function. Therefore in humans, the hand may have
the role, but does not have the function walking. Hence
he concludes that among the instances of realizables that
are realizables for the same type of process can be both
roles and functions depending on the species the realiz-
able’s bearer belongs to. This presents a problem for the
distinction between functions and roles. We will come
back to this distinction in due course, but it should be
noted that this problem exists for Lord mainly because
of the reference to homologues in other species in his
function definition. To put it bluntly: Had evolution
stopped after the first species, according to Lord’s defin-
ition, there would not have been any biological function
at all. If we look only at humans, we would not suppose
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stances for appropriately trained individuals. Therefore,
it seems that connecting functions by definition with ho-
mologues in other species (and their respective func-
tions) does introduce more difficulties than it solves,
even if homologues are of huge importance heuristically.
Function vs. role
Let us in more detail review the differences between
functions and roles. Lord [44] states that in actual bio-
medical ontologies, this distinction between functions
and roles is hardly observed. Lord cites OBI, the Ontol-
ogy for Biomedical Investigation [45], as an example that
ignores this distinction. The context dependence does
not seem sufficient to distinguish functions from roles.
Dumontier has claimed that on the level of proteins and
molecules the distinction between functions and roles
becomes redundant: “The difference between functions
and roles is not particularly obvious in molecular sys-
tems and may in fact be redundant. For instance, the
function of an enzyme is to catalyze a reaction […] Every
time a protein executes such functionality, it necessarily
realizes the enzyme role” [46]. Consequently, Dumontier
uses only roles in his analysis of molecular reaction. This
seems appropriate because the very same type of protein
can have the enzyme role in one reaction type and a dif-
ferent (e.g. substrate) role in a different reaction type. In
our approach, we would ascribe several dispositions to
the protein as prerequisites to the different realizations
that would correspond to the roles of enzyme etc., so
the protein would have dispositions and roles, but no
functions. Also, subrelations of the “hasParticipant” rela-
tion could be employed when the different participants
of a reaction are classified according to their roles like
“hasSubstrate”, “hasProduct” or “hasCatalyst”. Note that
the inverse relation “participatesIn” and its subrelations
cannot be used for this purpose because the same type
of molecule can have different roles in reactions and,
thus, it will generally not be true that all molecules par-
ticipate in some reaction type.
Accordingly, many so-called functions in biomedical
ontologies are, strictly speaking, roles. Also the so-called
use functions of artefacts are roles. To come back to our
function criteria, roles clearly fail the first two, Teleology
(1) and Restriction (2). They fail the Teleology criterion
because a role-bearer is not created for the playing of a
mere role. This seems obvious in the case of artefact use
cases not intended by the designer, i.e. using a chair to
stand on to change a lightbulb, or social roles. Similarly,
rabbits have not been selected for being food for foxes,
though they may serve the role of fox food. Roles also
fail the essential-accidental distinction; as can be seen by
the examples given so far, roles are all accidental in a
sense. The other criteria are less clear. Malfunctioningcan, in some cases, be applied to roles, especially to so-
cial roles. In other cases, there is no plausible norm for
the role to be evaluated against, as in cases of accidental
use or misuse, because an artefact that is explicitly used
for an unintended purpose will not be expected to per-
form optimally. Roles also usually must have some phys-
ical support in the dispositions and abilities of their
bearers to have successful realizations. For example, a
screwdriver can only serve the role as a makeshift chisel,
because of its shape, its hardness etc.
Functions vs. dispositions
Now, what does our review tell us about the relation be-
tween functions and dispositions? A common philosoph-
ical position thinks of dispositions as a certain type of
properties [7,8,47]. According to this position, a dispos-
ition is a causal property that is linked to a realization,
i.e. to a specific behaviour or process which the individ-
ual that bears the disposition will exhibit under certain
circumstances or as a response to a certain trigger. Some-
thing is water-soluble if it can dissolve in water. In this fash-
ion, dispositions establish a link between independent
continuants (stable things) and occurrents (processes). The
fundamental connection is the following: Continuant type
S has disposition type D for a realization type P and, in case
some token p of P occurs as the realization of an instance
of D, then an instance s of type S is both the bearer of the
disposition d and a participant of this process instance p.
The category of dispositions is often treated as a special
kind of dependent continuants that are linked to a process
of realization by a respective formal relationship [6-8].
Some, but not all of the positions surveyed above are
explicit about the relations between functions and dispo-
sitions, and those that are do not agree on this matter.
While Cummins writes that “if something functions as a
pump in a system […] then it must be capable of pump-
ing” and that “to attribute a function to something is, in
part, to attribute a disposition to it” ([26]; p. 757–8),
Millikan states that a thing’s having a function “has to
do not with its powers but with its history” ([31]; p. 17).
On a first superficial view, the idea that functions are, in
fact, dispositions seems to be at least compatible with
most of the positions reviewed: According to the causal
role accounts, functions can be identified with disposi-
tions quite easily. Millikan’s resistance notwithstanding,
other authors and BFO 2 combine an etiological account
with the claim that functions are evolutionarily acquired
dispositions [9,33]. Intentional accounts can argue that
functions are specially designed dispositions and the au-
thors of the ICE account actually state that function
ascriptions are special kinds of disposition ascriptions.
More scrutiny, however, will show that the criteria (3a)
and (3b), i.e. normativity and malfunctioning, require us
not to subsume functions under dispositions.
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We have seen that among others, both BFO 2 and
Houkes and Vermaas conceive of functions as special
dispositions (or of function ascriptions as special ascrip-
tions of dispositions). We will now apply some of the
criteria for functions above to try to capture also the
prima facie differences between functions, roles and dis-
positions. Dispositions can be blocked or incompletely
realized, but their bearers are not evaluated in a norma-
tive fashion. We usually do not evaluate the realization
of a disposition like inflammability; although, we cer-
tainly have rational expectations about the “perform-
ance” of the bearer of a disposition and rely on them in
our intentions. Suppose that someone wants to start a
campfire to get warmth and all available wood is wet. In
such a case, the wood will only burn with difficulty and
one will in fact evaluate the available wood negatively
with respect to its inflammability, but only because one
ascribed a use function (i.e. a certain role) to the wood
before. The having of a disposition need not explain the
existence of the disposition-bearer, so they generally fail
with respect to the teleology criterion, although there
might be some cases where the having of a disposition
does explain the existence of its bearer. There are mate-
rials (like alloys or textiles) that are specifically created
for their dispositions because the artefacts made from
the material will need those dispositions to fulfil the
functions they are intended for. Thus, in these cases,
some chunk of the alloy comes into existence because it
was designed to have a certain disposition. Could this be
taken as an argument for functions as special disposi-
tions? We do not think so. The teleological dimension,
like the normative one, applies to dispositions only in
the case of artefacts or in connection with intentional
use; that is, in contexts that have a teleological compo-
nent (usually intentional) anyway.
Peter Kroes has also argued against seeing functions as
a type of dispositions because dispositions lack the nor-
mative dimension we need for functions [48]. Although
his argument relies on Carnap’s dated analysis of dispo-
sitions, it does show the salient difference and could
probably be adapted within a more sophisticated analysis
of dispositions.
Dispositions are usually ascribed because of their
realization (their performance). They can be distin-
guished from functions according to the criterion (4a)
because there is no tension between current perform-
ance and normativity for dispositions. Other than func-
tions, dispositions do not face the threat of being mere
epiphenomena.
One further central difference between dispositions on
the one hand and functions and roles on the other hand
seems to lie in their context-dependence. Continuants may
lose or acquire dispositions, but not without fundamentalchanges within the bearer. In contrast, many functions can
be performed by different types of bearers and an object
may have different functions in different contexts without
any change in itself. Chopsticks, for example, have the func-
tion to support eating. Similar sticks found in the woods do
not have any such function, though they may have the very
same physical structure and, hence, the same dispositions.
Dispositions, that is, are purely internally grounded, while
the function of the chopsticks is a historical property due
to the way this artefact has been produced. At the other
end of the spectrum, social functions and roles are exter-
nally grounded; that is, they are dependent on the respect-
ive context, relational and historical properties and mostly
independent from the physical structure of their bearers.
Biological functions like those of organs, enzymes etc. lie
somewhat in between these extremes, as an entity can usu-
ally perform several functions in a certain range of contexts.
They are objective systemic functions in the sense men-
tioned above and not merely ascribed by an agent; their
context-dependence is fixed by the functional hierarchy of
the respective physiological system. An organ like the liver
has many functions, like the production of bile, glycogen
storage, cholesterol synthesis etc., but all these are fixed by
the respective physiological systems in which the liver and
its products are functionally involved. They are not as arbi-
trary or flexible as the screwdriver that can serve the use
functions (i.e. roles) of a can opener or a weapon.
Do functions depend on dispositions?
For all of these reasons, we should assume that functions
are not identical to dispositions. Nevertheless, even if
they are distinct entities, functions could ontologically
depend on dispositions. The support criterion suggests
indeed that, in some sense, functions could be “based”
on dispositions. On the intentional account, functions of
artefacts are clearly independent from the dispositions of
their bearers; due to the fallibility of human designers,
the one could easily occur without the other. From the
point of the fictionalist extension of the planning account
to biological functions, however, the existence of a function
implies the existence of the corresponding disposition in
typical cases if we transfer the usual assumptions of God’s
omniscience and benevolence to our fictional designer.
Nonetheless, even if a biological function is typically ac-
companied by a disposition, this concurrence is not univer-
sal, as proven by malfunctioning.
In our view, the dispositions are part of the internal
structure of a thing; they determine whether it can fulfil
the respective function in a given context. Johansson
[49] calls this the “substratum” of a function. While the
function itself is independent from its substratum, its
realization depends on its existence. This dependence
can be a generic one because sometimes different dispo-
sitions or structures can ground the same function: E.g.
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different technical setups [49].
As we know biological functions only through their ac-
tual realizations, we would have no reason to ascribe
them unless instances of a certain kind typically dis-
played that behaviour and, a fortiori, possessed a corre-
sponding substratum disposition. How would we know
the biological function of, say, a heart, if hearts did not
typically have the disposition to pump blood and did not
typically realize this function? Thus, there should be
some evidential connection between the function and
the disposition of the organ. This way, we can meet the
Support requirement (4) by giving it an epistemic inter-
pretation: The discovery and ascription of a function is
epistemically supported by the preliminary discovery and
ascription of dispositions in the same or other instances
of a certain species.
On the other hand, many diseases like, e.g. heart insuf-
ficiency, are characterized by the very contrast between
functions and the lack of corresponding dispositions and
so is malfunctioning in general. Malfunctioning artefacts
or diseased organs are characterised by the loss of the
disposition to fulfil their function. E.g. a lung with a car-
cinoma will still have the function to serve as an oxygen
provider for the body, but the function may no longer
be realized because the corresponding disposition (to be
able to serve as an oxygen provider for the body) is no
longer present. Such an account of malfunctioning works
because (and only if) the function is ontologically inde-
pendent of the disposition. From this point of view, the task
of medicine is to restore the disposition matching to the
function, such that the organ would be (fully) functional
again. In such a fashion one can also account for healing
processes: A healing process, then, consists of restoring a
disposition where there is a function without its corre-
sponding disposition. We conclude that the corresponding
disposition is only necessary for the realization of a func-
tion, not for the function itself. Since in biological (and
many artefactual) cases we can evaluate the perform-
ance of token functions with respect to what is a nor-
mal realization for the function type and because the
normal realization is dependent on the corresponding
disposition, we have a correspondence of function and
disposition at the type level or for prototypical tokens.
However, this is to be distinguished from a token-level
dependence of the function on the corresponding dis-
position. If we want to accommodate malfunctioning,
we should reject the latter.
As a source of the normativity of functions, we can iden-
tify the type membership of an instance of a function
bearer. Being a token of a type involves an evaluative di-
mension [32,50,51]. Therefore, in function ascription, the
attribution of a function to a type of entity takes preference
over the ascription to a token. A token is supposed to havea function and be able to perform it successfully because it
belongs to a certain type.
A further reason not to treat functions as special dis-
positions is the following difficulty: In formalised fash-
ion, type-level relations like “hasFunction” are usually
defined by universal quantification over their instances
using the corresponding token-level-relation [52]. As
said above in the “normal” or paradigmatic case, a func-
tion of an entity comes along with the disposition to
perform this very function, but as we want to allow for
the possibility of malfunctioning tokens that have lost
the corresponding disposition and, consequently, per-
form the function insufficiently or not at all, we cannot
assert a token-level dependence of disposition and func-
tion for all instances of a type. One option here would
be to distinguish between canonical and non-canonical
entities within a type of function-bearers. Such a distinc-
tion is used, e.g. with respect to anatomical structures in
the BioTop ontology [53]. If one follows this approach,
all instances of the canonical type have the correspond-
ing disposition and do (or would) function adequately,
so for this subtype the standard definitional procedure
works. The instances of the non-canonical subtype will
not be ascribed the disposition, but only the function.
Recommendations
We can summarize the discussion by suggesting a new
classification schema for the three realizables function,
disposition and role. It concurs with BFO 1.1.1 in treat-
ing functions as siblings of dispositions rather than spe-
cial dispositions as in BFO 2. It makes use of two
independent criteria:
 Structure [6]: Does the realizable supervene on the
internal structure or is it externally grounded?
 Rigidity [54]: Is the realizable essential or accidental
to its bearer?
Structure and Rigidity correspond to two flavours of
(non-)optionality. While Structure deals with (non-)option-
ality given the physical structure of the bearer, Rigidity deals
with (non-)optionality given the “essence” of the bearer (i.e.
given the kind of thing it is). Thus, we end up with a cross
classification of realizables presented in Table 3.
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can be optional given a certain physical structure of its
bearer. All realizables that are externally grounded, i.e.
grounded in some context, are optional in this sense, e.g. all
roles. In contrast, dispositions are internally grounded,
based on the bearer’s physical structure and, therefore, not
optional given the bearer’s physical structure. A few clarifi-
cations seem in order: Internal grounding does not require
that there is a one-to-one-correspondence between a dis-
position type and a structural type on which it is based.
Various instances of one and the same type of dispositions
can be based on quite different physical structures. Fragility,
for example, may be based on the molecular structure of
dry wood as well as on the structure of glass, respectively.
Like many other dispositions, fragility can be structurally
constituted in multiple ways, but in all of these ways the
disposition’s base is a structure literally internal to the
bearer of the disposition, and it is independent of the con-
text or the realization conditions.
There is a debate whether dispositions need laws of na-
ture to get “connected” to their realizations or whether laws
of nature are actually based on dispositions, so the latter
are ontologically more basic than laws [55]. We will not
enter this debate here, but we note that even if dispositions
depend on laws of nature (whatever laws of nature are), this
will not be an ontological dependence that would force us
to reject the claim that dispositions are internal to their
bearers.
Second, a realizable can be optional given the essence
of its bearer. Roles are optional in this sense, and since a
bearer can gain and lose dispositions, some dispositions
are also optional in this way. Note that in this case they
are not optional given the physical structure, but op-
tional given the bearer: The same bearer can survive the
acquisition of such a disposition (by learning, training,
modification, etc.) and it may lose it without ceasing to
be (by forgetting, wear out, modification, etc.), although
the bearer has to change its physical structure in order
to gain or lose dispositions. However, not all dispositions
are optional for a given bearer. Some dispositions, like
the disposition of a proton to attract electrons, are es-
sential: Losing this disposition would imply that the pro-
ton ceases to be a proton, i.e. that it ceases to exist.
There might be only a few essential dispositions and
they might be restricted to the domain of fundamental
physics. For this reason, we acknowledge their existence,
but do not encourage the introduction of separate onto-
logical categories for accidental and essential disposi-
tions, respectively. Functions, too, are essential for their
bearers: Given the essence of being a heart, it is not op-
tional to have the function to pump blood; and given the
essence of being a screwdriver, it is not optional to have
the function to manipulate screws. This is why screw-
drivers are made; it is their origin, without which theywould not be the things they are. Without these functions
they would not be hearts or screwdrivers, but rather
something else. This notion of essentiality for functions
seems to be shared by Kitamura and Mizoguchi with re-
spect to artefacts [22]. In a similar way, both the etio-
logical and the system account can argue that the bearers
of biological functions come into existence in order to ful-
fil these functions; the fictionalist account will assert similar
things relative to the respective design fiction.
Functions are externally grounded. We argued that
there are good arguments not to treat functions as dis-
positions, nor to make functions dependent on disposi-
tions. This distinction is our central disagreement with
the BFO 2 suggestion discussed above. We also define
roles in a rather narrow way (following BFO, but diver-
ging from [13,28,56] and others): On our account, roles
are never essential for its bearer. Hence, we think that
assigning an essential “breather” or “eater” role to a hu-
man being is a loose way of speaking and not to be taken
ontologically serious. Breathing and eating are processes,
not functions or roles. True, humans have to participate
in breathing and eating processes on a regular basis, but
there is no need to add to it by postulating a breather
role or an eater role for human beings. One could treat
participation (or rather the property of being a possible
and viable participant) in processes as a role in a very
general sense. Starting from the original BFO suggestion,
however, the category name “Role” is used in a more spe-
cific way that is distinct from participation. In our view,
participation is an ontological relation [57] (which would
be modelled as an object property in OWL), whereas a
role is a realizable; that is, a (specifically) dependent
continuant. The realization of a role, of course, in-
volves the role-bearer standing in the participation
relation of a realization process of the type that is im-
plied by that role. One of the main points of introdu-
cing roles is to have the option to model these less
strict relationships with a modal character that cannot
be modelled by stating the participant relation which
only concerns the actual participation. Therefore, the
so-called “use functions” (cf. above) are to be classified
as roles in our classification scheme, in agreement with
the BFO conception of roles.
Conclusions
We surveyed several accounts for the analysis of func-
tions, both for biological functions and for engineered
functions, and we evaluated them with respect to a list
of criteria compiled from the literature. While some of
these theories treat functions as a subclass of disposi-
tions, this cannot account for the normativity connected
with function ascriptions and for the possibility of mal-
functioning. We suggest a new classification of realiz-
ables by means of two independent criteria yielding four
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tions, functions and roles. Treating functions as a cat-
egory in its own right solves the problems of normativity
and malfunctioning.
On this account, functions are not only disjoint from
dispositions, they are also ontologically independent
from dispositions. Functions are, however, normally
and mostly accompanied by corresponding dispositions.
Moreover, there cannot be a realization of a function with-
out there being a realization of a matching disposition. It is
for these reasons, why it is so difficult to distinguish be-
tween these categories. Malfunctioning, however, requires
them to be distinct categories: It happens in case a function
is present but the corresponding disposition is lacking.
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